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Abstract
Latin America is well known as an inequitable region. As it is recognized, inequality and cor-
ruption perception weaken the way that political institutions works and the democratic system.
Focusing on Latin American and Caribbean countries, this paper analyzes what are the elements
shaping tax morale. In particular, how the context influences ethical grounds decisions such as the
predisposition to pay taxes is analyzed, using the survey carried out in 2005 by Latinobarometro.
The objective is to analyze how country performance determines tax morale. To do so, four probit
models are estimated using Gini index, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) as explanatory variables. As expected we found
that some socio-demographic variables play a relevant role. Interestingly, we also found that,
in this attitude, LAC countries do not register a gender bias. However, those are not our main
contributions to the literature on the field. The most important results are linked to: 1) the level
matters, GDPpc increases the probability of people having tax morale, 2) moreover, income dis-
tribution also influence on tax morale but in opposite direction and 3) corruption perception also
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reduces tax morale. Those results show that the quality of institutions matters and therefore, the
way that democracy works play a relevant role.
JEL Classification: H26, H73.
Keywords: Tax morale, corruption, inequality, democracy, macroeconomic performance.
Cómo afecta la desigualdad la moral fiscal en
Latinoamérica y el Caribe
Resumen
La literatura previa muestra que los más ricos tienen una probabilidad mayor de involucrarse en
causas medioambientales. El aporte de este trabajo es analizar si hay un efecto conjunto entre
el ingreso subjetivo y el desempeño del paı́s de residencia sobre esta probabilidad. Para ello, se
utiliza la quinta ola de la Encuesta Mundial de Valores. Se muestra que el ingreso subjetivo y las
caracterı́sticas del paı́s de residencia son determinantes claves de estas actitudes ası́ como lo es el
efecto-interacción entre estas variables. Por lo tanto, las medidas que afectan las caracterı́sticas
de los paı́ses podrı́an tener un impacto relevante en la disposición de los individuos a participar.
Clasificación JEL: H26, H73.
Palabras clave: Moral fiscal, corrupción, inequidad, democracia, desempeño macroeconómico
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1 Introduction
Values, tastes, expectations and consequently individual’s decisions are influ-
enced by the context. Therefore, comparative research could not ignore con-
text effects; in particular when analyzing individuals´ behaviors with respect
to the law (Bergman and Nevarez, 2005). This paper analyzes some elements
that shape tax morale as a proxy of individual’s ethic behavior. It is expected
that some individual characteristics play a relevant role. However, our main
contribution is based on analyzing how inequality and the perceived quality
of institutions affect the probability of behaving in accordance with the law
regarding evading or not taxes.
Tax morale is defined as the individuals’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes,
which is treated as a ”black box” by many studies of the subject, considering
it as a residual in the analysis of tax evasion (Feld and Frey, 2002).
Given this definition, we found, as previous literature, that some socio-
demographic characteristics play a relevant role, as well as related with trust,
democracy and national pride (Azar and Rossi, 2008). However, our main
contribution to the literature is the finding of the influence of context. In
particular, we found that corruption perception, Gross Domestic Product per
capita and inequality do shape people decisions towards paying taxes. There-
fore, we can conclude that institutions, equity and the way that democracy
works make the difference.
2 Background
Analyzing the decision of whether or not to evade income taxation, Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) found that evasion will depend on the expected savings
resulting from the evasion, the probability of being caught and the magnitude
of the monetary sanction in case of being caught. Some other studies extend
this analysis including other characteristics such as cooperation among tax-
payers to evade (Boadway et al., 2002), the corruption in the public admin-
istration (Polinsky and Shavell, 2001) or variables related to the compliance
with formal and informal rules and the way in which the tax authority recog-
nizes taxpayers’ rights and characteristics (Feld and Frey, 2002).
Nevertheless, these works predict levels of compliance that are lower than
those actually observed, so the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes is gaining
more importance in the literature than the levels of compliance (Alm and Tor-
gler, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2005; Schneider and Torgler, 2004;
Torgler, 2001, 2005).
Alm and Torgler (2004), using data from the World Values Survey (1990
and 1995) for United States and 15 European countries, show the importance
of social and cultural variables. The highest level of tax morale was found in
the United States (above Austria and Switzerland). They also found that some
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socio-demographics characteristics matter and the same is true in the case of
context (trust in the legal system and parliament and level of financial satis-
faction). At the same time, they find a strong negative correlation between
tax morale and the size of the formal sector. In the same line, Schneider and
Torgler (2004) analyzing the cases of Belgium, Spain and Switzerland found
that intra-national cultural differences have a significant impact on the level
of tax morale.
Focusing on fiscal policies implications of tax morale, Schaltegger and Tor-
gler (2005), found that taxpayers’ attitudes are significantly influenced, among
other factors, by the government’s decisions in the field of tax policies and by
the authorities’ behavior. The effects of tax systems, public expenditure, effec-
tiveness of tax administration and the total amount of taxes, are aspects that
play a relevant role.
One of the first studies in the subject in Latin America was made by Torgler
(2005) using the Latinobarometro 1998 and the World Values Survey 1981-
1997. He finds that tax morale levels are higher in Central America and the
Caribbean.
In light of the existing literature, the objective of this paper is to analyze
whether an environment with high levels of corruption and / or inequality
leads to a decline in the tax morale.
3 Data and methodology
The data source is the Latinobarometro 2005. This survey is a public opinion
study that is carried out annually in 18 Latin American countries, with more
than 19,000 personal interviews that represent about 400 million people. The
unit of analysis is individuals responding the the survey.
The dependent variable, that is the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (tax
morale, tm), is captured with the question: “Within a 1 to 10 scale, where 1
means “not at all justifiable” and 10 means “totally justifiable”, how much
justifiable do you think tax evading is?” For ease of reading we inverted the
order in such a way that 1 corresponds to the lower level of tax morale and
10 to the highest and with the aim of taking into account the highest levels
of tax morale we construct the binary variable tm in the following way: tm
equals 1 if respondent indicates 9 or 10 and 0 in other case.1 Table 1 shows the
distribution of answers to this question.
Given our objective we converted our dependent variable into a binary de-
pendent variable, gathering answers 9-10 into the category high tax morale,
(binary variable value 1) and the rest as value 0 (low tax morale). Then we
estimate probit models including the following explanatory variables. Edu-
cation level is captured through a group of binary variables (Educa 1 - 5) that
1This is the case because 8.3 is the mean and 8 the median.
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Do not answer / do not know 9,22%
Total 100%
indicates whether the individual finished primary educarion (Educa1), has un-
completed secondary (Educa2), completed secondary (Educa3), and has some
university (Educa4) or completed university studies (Educa5). In our model
we omitted the lowest education level. We should expect that tax morale rises
with education level.
Religion and religiosity are included as explanatory variables, through
Norelig and Catholic variables. They capture whether the person declares not
attending religious services and whether the person declares to be catholic re-
spectively. We expect that religious and catholic people tend to have a higher
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. Then we included a variable that captures
self perceived level of income in a 1-10 scale (with 1 poorest and 10 richest).
We have no a priori expected sign of this variable’s effect.
To capture the individual’s labor condition we included a series of 5 binary
variables that are: Unemp, Inactive, Public, Private and Selfemp. They repre-
sent whether the person declares to be unemployed, inactive, employed in the
public sector, employed in the private sector or self employed, respectively. In
this case, we expect self-employed people to show lower levels of tax morale,
regarding that taxes represent a more direct cost to people that run some kind
of own business, than to people that work as an employee.
The rest of the demographic control variables included are Women, Age18-
25, Age26-40, Age41-60, Age 61+, Married and Divorced. In this case, we expect
older people to show higher levels of tax morale regarding the higher per-
ceived costs in terms of social status.
The most important variables whose effect we intend to study are: Gini,
GDPpc and TI. The first one is an ordinal variables (values 1-3) that repre-
sents the value of individual’s country Gini Index. More precisely, whether
that value is lower than percentile 25, between percentile 25 and 75, or higher
than percentile 75, respectively. We expect that people who live in countries
where wealth is more evenly distributed have a higher motivation to pay
taxes. GDPpc represents individual’s per capita gross domestic product. The
expected effect of this variable is that people living in richer countries tend to
have higher levels of tax morale.
Finally, the variable TI represents country’s ranking in the Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The ordinal value (1-3) rep-
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Table 2. Description of independent variables
Area Variable Values Mean
Human
Capital
Educa1 1 completed primary school (omitted) 0 .503
Educa2 1 did not finish secondary school 0.175
Educa3 1 completed secondary school 0.178
Educa4 1 did not finish university studies 0.079
Educa5 1 completed university studies 0.065
Religion and
religiosity
Norelig 1 does not attend to religious services 0.114
Catholic 1 identies with Roman Catholic 0.72
Income Incscale Self-placement in 10 point income scale 3.72
Labor market
Unemp 1 unemployed 0.066
Inactive 1 inactive (omitted) 0.362
Public 1 working in public sector 0.073
Private 1 working in a private enterprise 0.172




Woman 1 being a woman 0.51
Age18-25 1 age is between 18 and 25 y.o. (omitted) 0.249
Age26-40 1 age is between 26 and 40 y.o. 0.348
Age41-60 1 age is between 41 and 60 y.o. 0.271
Age61+ 1 age is 61 y.o. or more 0.132
Married 1 married or living as married 0.571




1 Gini Index is lower than percentile 25
0.538
2 Gini Index is between percentile 25 and 75
3 Gini Index is higher than percentile 75
(p25 = 0.505 and p75 = 0.579)
GDPpc Log. of GDP, Atlas method (current US$) 8.67
TI
Transp. Int., Corrup. Perc. Index. (CPI)
3.523
1 CPI is lower than percentile 25
2 CPI is between percentile 25 and 75
3 CPI is higher than percentile 75
(p25 = 2.3 and p75 = 3.9)
resent whether person’s country CPI is lower than percentile 25, between per-
centile 25 and 75 or higher than percentile 75. Intuitively, we expect that peo-
ple living in countries were levels of corruption perception are low, are more
likely to be more “willing” to pay taxes, than people who live in countries
where corruption is seen as an important problem. In the next section we
present the results of the estimated probit models and its marginal effects.
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4 Results
Table 3 shows the estimated probit models. The four columns represent 4
different flavors of the estimated models. In all cases we included age, sex,
education level, marital status, employment status, income level, and religion
as independent variables. The difference is whether we included country’s
per capita GDP (model 1), country’s Gini Index (model 2), country’s Trans-
parency International Corruption Perception Index (model 3), or Gini Index
and corruption perception index (model 4) as explanatory variables. Table 2
shows the definition of all the independent variables used.
In table 4 you may find the estimated marginal effects,that show the change
in the probability of having tax morale given a change in the independent vari-
ables. Firstly, as could be seen in table 4, the selection of the model does not
change the average probability of having a high tax morale. In all cases the
mean value of tax morale is 50.54% for all the four models presented.
4.1 As expected some socio-demographic characteristics matters
It is found that all the included age groups are significant at 1% and more
important we found that tax morale increases with age. As table 4 shows,
the change in the probability of having tax morale is always positive and it
increases as the person changes between groups. While belonging to the first
group increases the probability almost 7 percent points (pp), having between
41 and 60 years old raises the probability almost 14 pp. This is consistent
with previous literature (as Azar and Rossi, 2008) that states that older people
is more sensitive to sanctions or to the shame of being caught in an illegal
activity. The aim of not harming social status which was attained with the
passage of the years is a cost that people may take into account.
The same is true in the case of years of schooling. We found a significant
difference between the lowest level and the remaining levels and the change
in the probability becomes higher as years of education increases (the change
ranges between 2.2 pp and 9.3 pp).
However, the higher an individual place himself in the income scale, the
lower the probability of having tax morale. In this case, probability changes
between 1.5 pp and 1.8 pp. This result implies that the cost of legality is in-
versely proportional to an individual’s income. Moreover, is consistent with
some reforms in Latin American countries regarding tax structures. In par-
ticular, with the purpose of improving equity, some countries change tax sys-
tems with the purpose of richer people pay more taxes. Those reforms may
strengthen tax evader’s incentives of avoiding to pay taxes and this effect
could be higher in the case of rich people.
Regarding religious groups and religiosity, we found that attendance to
religious services makes no differences in attitudes towards tax morale. How-
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ever, those people who identify with Roman Catholic religion are more likely
to have less tax morale; in this case the probability decreases, on average, 2.8
pp. This result is consistent with Weber’s thesis. He argued that for example,
the culture of Protestantism would have left an enduring legacy in values that
still remain visible today. Moreover Weber stresses that an important aspect
of Protestantism concerns the teaching of broader ethical standards, includ-
ing those of honesty, willingness to obey the law, and trustworthiness, which
serve as the foundation of business confidence, good faith dealings, and vol-
untary contract compliance.
We also found that self-employed people are more likely to have less tax
morale, in this case the probability reduces between 1.8 and 2.8 pp. It might
be possible that self-employed people are exposed to corrupted behavior, as
well as the fact that they suffer more directly and are more conscious of the tax
burden. However, we found that there are no significant differences between
those working for a private enterprize or in the public sector. Moreover, we
found that gender, marital status and being unemployed do not influence tax
morale,as all this variables appear to be non statistically significant in all the
four models.
4.2 Our models also show that context affects decision-making process and tax
morale
In order to capture income level effects among countries, model 1 includes
GDPpc. As expected, It was found that this variable makes a significant dif-
ference and it is worth noting that its impact is relatively high, 11.2 pp. More-
over, we include the logarithm of the variable so the result implies that people
who live in those countries that grow faster are more likely to have tax morale.
GDPpc is highly correlated with GINI index and Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index (TI), but in opposite direction. Therefore, model
2-4 focus on those variables and do not include GDPpc.
Models 2 to 4 show that inequality and the level of corruption matters. Ac-
cording to TI ranking, the lower the level of corruption perception, the higher
a country is placed and we found that the probability of having tax morale in-
creases as the country improves its position. This result is consistent with Ca-
belkova (2001) findings. The incentives to take corrupt actions are affected by
individual perception about the level of corruption and the authority’s level of
tolerance. This perception may affect both the demand and supply of corrupt
behavior. In countries where corruption is systemic it cannot be assumed that
the obligation of paying taxes is an accepted social norm. Corruption gen-
erally undermines the tax morale of the citizens, because they get frustrated
(Torgler, 2005).
On the other hand, inequality plays a relevant role in shaping tax morale
but in opposite direction. We found that Gini Index is significant and in this
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case, the probability decreases. Therefore equity improves tax morale. With
the increased inequality, the rich, as a class or as interest group, can use lob-
bying, political contributions or bribery to influence law-implementing pro-
cesses and to buy favorable interpretations of the law. This process worsens
institutions performance and democratic policies.
Model 2 shows that the probability of having tax morale reduces 6.7 pp
as GINI index decreases and according to model 3 this probability reduces
4.5 pp when corruption perception lowers.Given those results, we estimated
model 4, in this model we included both GINI index and TI. It is worth noting
that both variables are significant and the sign remains. However, we found
that taking into account both the changes in the probability in absolute value,
inequality plays the most relevant role: the net effect is negative. Finally, the
previous results confirm that policy-makers decisions are also important in
order to improve the quality of institutions and income distributions.
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Table 3. Estimation results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
tm tm tm tm
Age 18-25 0.169a 0.180a 0.184a 0.173a
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
Age 26-40 0.250a 0.272a 0.271a 0.255a
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
Age 41-60 0.336a 0.363a 0.356a 0.338a
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041]
Woman -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.024
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
Educa2 0.082a 0.079a 0.076b 0.059b
[0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030]
Educa3 0.092a 0.118a 0.111a 0.107a
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
Educa4 0.178a 0.158a 0.172a 0.162a
[0.041] [0.040] [0.041] [0.041]
Educa5 0.228a 0.235a 0.227a 0.233a
[0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044]
Married 0.021 0.025 0.018 0.024
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Divorced 0.032 0.053 0.046 0.047
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041]
Selfemp -0.046c -0.071a -0.053b -0.048c
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Public 0.017 0.018 0.034 0.035
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041]
Unemp -0.047 -0.039 -0.051 -0.042
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]
Incscale -0.046a -0.037a -0.038a -0.040a
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Norelig -0.006 0.033 0.017 0.004
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
Catholic -0.089a -0.075a -0.044c -0.053b







Constant -2.389a 0.302a -0.299a 0.033
[0.201] [0.053] [0.047] [0.059]
Observations 15146 15146 15146 15146
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. Model 1 includes GDPpc. Model 2 includes Gini
index. Model 3 includes TI index. Model 4 includes Gini and TI index.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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Table 4. Marginal effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Probability 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504
Age 18-25 0,067 0,072 0,073 0,069
Age 26-40 0,099 0,108 0,108 0,101
Age 41-60 0,132 0,143 0,140 0,133
Educa2* 0,033 0,031 0,030 0,023
Educa3* 0,037 0,047 0,044 0,043
Educa4* 0,071 0,063 0,068 0,065
Educa5* 0,090 0,093 0,090 0,092
Selfemp -0,018 -0,028 -0,021 -0,019
Inscale -0,018 -0,015 -0,015 -0,016
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5 Conclusions
With the aim of analyzing how country performance influence on tax morale
at individual level, this paper studies the willingness to avoid paying taxes
and the effect of some key variables on this attitude.
There are a set of individual characteristics that play relevant role (age,
years of schooling, income scale, being self-employed and religious denomi-
nation). Regarding those results, we conclude that the asymmetries of rules
make a significant difference; they reduce the probability of having tax morale.
However, social status influence on people’s attitudes and its impact is higher.
Latin American and Caribbean countries show gender biases in several
issues related to culture and morale views. However, we found that there
is no significant difference in attitudes between women and men. We also
found that context is determinant in shaping people attitudes and that there
is room for the improvement of the quality of institutions and in particular,
the democratic system.
Firstly, GDP per capita influence people’s tax morale. The probability of
having tax morale increases 11.2 pp. People who live in those countries that
grow faster are more likely to have tax morale.
Secondly, we found that the probability of having tax morale increases 4.5
pp as the country improves its position in TI, Corruption Perception Index.
Therefore, avoiding paying taxes is less costly when individual’s perception
of corruption is high and/ or the authority’s level of tolerance is also high.
Thirdly, inequality also plays a relevant role in shaping tax morale but in
opposite sense. We found that inequality reduces tax morale (the probability
reduces 5.4 pp). With the increased inequality, the rich, as a class or as interest
group, can use lobbying, political contributions or bribery to influence law-
implementing processes and to buy favorable interpretations of the law. This
process worsens institutions performance and democratic systems.
Finally, the joint effect of the quality of institutions and inequality is nega-
tive. Therefore, the latter is more important than the former. So, there is room
for pro-active government role.
Revista de Economı́a del Rosario. Vol. 15. No. 2. Julio - Dic 2012. 123 - 135
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